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Abstract. Model-free learning for multi-agent stochastic games is an active area of research. Existing rein-
forcement learning algorithms, however, are often restricted to zero-sum games, and are applicable
only in small state-action spaces or other simplified settings. Here, we develop a new data efficient
Deep-Q-learning methodology for model-free learning of Nash equilibria for general-sum stochastic
games. The algorithm uses a local linear-quadratic expansion of the stochastic game, which leads to
analytically solvable optimal actions. The expansion is parametrized by deep neural networks to give
it sufficient flexibility to learn the environment without the need to experience all state-action pairs.
We study symmetry properties of the algorithm stemming from label-invariant stochastic games and
as a proof of concept, apply our algorithm to learning optimal trading strategies in competitive
electronic markets.
1. Introduction. The study of equilibria in systems of interacting agents is ubiquitous
throughout the natural and social sciences. The classical approach to studying these equilibria
requires building a model of the interacting system, solving for its equilibrium, and studying
its properties thereafter. This approach often runs into complications, however, as a fine
balance between (i) model tractability and (ii) its ability to capture the main features of
the data it aims to represent, must be struck. Rather than taking a model-based approach,
it is possible to derive non-parametric reinforcement-learning (RL) methods to study these
equilibria. The main idea behind these methods is to directly approximate equilibria from
simulations or observed data, providing a powerful alternative to the usual approach.
The majority of the existing literature on RL is dedicated to single-player games. Most
modern approaches follow either a deep Q-learning approach(e.g. [16]), policy gradient meth-
ods (e.g. [18]), or some mixture thereof (e.g. [7]). RL methods have also been developed for
multi-agent games, but are for the most part restricted to the case of zero-sum games. For a
survey see [1].
There are recent efforts on extending RL to general sum games with fictitious play as in [9],
or with iterative fixed point methods as in [14]. In the specific context of (discrete state-action
space) mean-field games, [6] provides a Q-learning algorithm for solving for the Nash-equilibria.
Many of the existing algorithms suffer either from computational intractability as the size and
complexity of a game increases, when state-action space becomes continuous, or from the
inability to model complex game behaviour.
Hu and Wellman [8] introduce a Q-learning based approach for obtaining Nash equilibria
in general-sum stochastic games. Although they prove convergence of the algorithm for games
with finite game and action spaces, their approach is computationally infeasible for all but
˚SJ would like to acknowledge the support of the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
(NSERC), [funding reference numbers RGPIN-2018-05705 and RGPAS-2018-522715].
:Department of Statistical Sciences, University of Toronto, Canada (p.casgrain@utoronto.ca).
;Department of Statistical Sciences, University of Toronto, Canada (brian.ning@mail.utoronto.ca).
§Department of Statistical Sciences, University of Toronto, Canada (sebastian.jaimungal@utoronto.ca, http://
sebastian.statistics.utoronto.ca.)
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
10
55
4v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
3 A
pr
 20
19
the simplest examples. The main computational bottleneck in their approach is the need
to repeatedly compute a local Nash equilibrium over states, which is an NP-hard operation
in general. Moreover, the method proposed in [8] does not extend to games where agents
choose continuous-valued controls or to games with either high-dimensional game state rep-
resentations or with large numbers of players. We instead combine the iLQG framework of
of [19, 5] and the Nash Q-learning algorithm of [8] to produce an algorithm which can learn
Nash equilibria in these more complex and practically relevant settings.
In particular, we decompose the state-action value (Q)-function as a sum of the value
function and the advantage function. We approximate the value function using a neural-
net, and we locally approximate the advantage function as linear-quadratic in the agents’
actions with coefficients that are non-linear functions of the features given by a neural-net.
This allows us to compute the Nash equilibrium analytically at each point in feature space
(i.e., the optimal action of all agents) in terms of the network parameters. Using this closed
form local Nash equilibrium, we derive an iterative actor-critic algorithm to learn the network
parameters.
In principle, our approach allows us to deal with stochastic games with a large number of
game state features and a large action space. Moreover, our approach can be easily adapted
to mean-field game (MFG) problems, which result from the infinite population limit of certain
stochastic games (see [11, 15, 2]), such as those developed in, e.g., [3, 4] or major-minor agent
MFGs such as those studied in, e.g., [10, 17, 12]. A drawback of the method we propose is the
restriction on the local structure of the proposed Q-function approximator. We find, however,
that the proposed approximators are sufficiently expressive in most cases, and perform well
in the numerical examples that we include in this paper.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a generic Markov
model for a general-sum stochastic game. In Section 3, we present optimality conditions
for the stochastic game and motivate our Q-learning approach to finding Nash equilibria.
4 introduces our local linear-quadratic approximations to the Q-function and the resulting
learning algorithm. We also provide several simplifications that arise in label-invariant games.
Section 5 covers implementation details and Section 6 presents some illustrative examples.
2. Model Setup. We consider a stochastic game with agents i P N :“ t1, 2, . . . , Nu all
competing together. We assume the state of the game is represented via the stochastic process
txtutPN so that for each time t, xt P X , for some separable Banach space X . At each time
t, agent-i chooses an action ui,t P Ui, where Ui is assumed to be a separable Banach space.
In the sequel, we use the notation u´i,t “ puj,tqjPN{tiu to denote the vector of actions of all
agents other than agent-i at time t and the notation ut “ puj,tqjPN to denote the vector of
actions of all agents. We assume that the game is a Markov Decision Process (MDP) with a
fully-visible game state. The MDP assumption is equivalent to assuming the joint state-action
process pxt,utq8t“1 is Markov, whose state transition probabilities are defined by the stationary
Markov transition kernel ppxt`1 | xt,utq and a distribution over initial states p0px0q.
At each step of the game, agents receive a reward that varies according to the current
state of the game, their own choice of actions, and the actions of all other agents. The agent-
i’s reward is represented by the function px, ui,u´iq ÞÑ ripx;ui,u´iq P R, so that at each
time t, agent-i accumulates a reward ripxt;ui,t,u´i,tq. We assume that each function ri is
2
continuously differentiable and concave in ui and is continuous in x and u´i.
At each time t, agent-i may observe other agents’ actions u´i,t, as well as the state of the
game xt. Moreover, each agent-i chooses their actions according to a deterministic Markov
policy X Q x ÞÑ piipxq P Ui. The objective of agent-i is to select the policy pii that maximizes
the objective functional Ri which represents their personal expected discounted future reward
over the remaining course of the game, given a fixed policy pii for themselves and a fixed policy
pi´i for all other players. The objective functional for agent-i is
(2.1) Ripx;pii,pi´iq “ E
« 8ÿ
t“0
γ´ti ripxt, pii,t,pi´i,tq
ff
,
where the expectation is over the process pxtqtPN, with x0 “ x, and where we assume γi P p0, 1q
is a fixed constant representing a discount rate. In Equation (2.1), we use the compressed
notation pii,t :“ piipxtq and pi´i,t :“ pi´ipxtq. The agent’s objective functional (2.1) explicitly
depends on the policy choice of all agents. Each agent, however, can only control their own
policy, and must choose their actions while conditioning on the behavior of all other players.
Agent-i therefore seeks a policy that optimizes their objective function, but remains robust
to the actions of others. In the end, agents’ policies form a Nash equilibrium – a collection of
policies pi˚pxq “ tpii˚ pxquiPN such that unilateral deviation from this equilibrium by a single
agent will result in a decrease in the value of that agent’s objective functional. Formally, we
say that a collection of policies pi˚ forms a Nash equilibrium if
(2.2) Ri
`
x;pii,pi
˚´
i
˘ ď Ri `x;pii˚ ,pi˚´ i˘
for all admissible policies pii and for all i P N. Informally, we can interpret the Nash equilibrium
as the policies for which each agent simultaneously maximizes their own objective function,
while conditioned on the actions of others.
3. Optimality Conditions. Our ultimate goal is to obtain an algorithm that can attain
the Nash equilibrium of the game without a-priori knowledge of its dynamics. In order to do
this, we first identify conditions that are more easily verifiable than the formal definition of a
Nash equilibrium given above.
We proceed by extending the well known Bellman equation for Nash equilibria. While
leaving pi˚´ i fixed, we may apply the dynamic programming principle to agents-i reward
Ripx;pii˚ ,pi˚´ iq resulting in
(3.1) Ripx;pii˚ ,pi˚´ iq “ max
uPUi
"
ripx, u,pi˚´ ipxqq ` γi E
x1„pp¨|x,uq
“Ripx1;pii˚,1,pi˚´ i,1q‰* .
At the Nash equilibrium, equation (3.1) is satisfied simultaneously for all i P N.
To express this more concisely, we introduce a vector notation. First define the vector-
valued function Rpx;piq “ pRipx;pii,pi´iqqiPN, consisting of the stacked vector of objective
functions. We call the stacked objective functions evaluated at their Nash equilibria the
stacked value function, which we write as V pxq :“ pVipxqqiN “Rpx;pi˚q.
Next, we define the Nash state-action value function, also called the Q-Function, which
we denote Qpx;uq :“ pQipx;ui,u´iqqiPN, where
(3.2) Qpx;uq “ rpx;uq ` γi E
x1„pp¨|x,uq
“
V px1q‰ ,
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and where we denote rpx,uq :“ pripx, ui,u´iqqiPN to indicate the vectorized reward function.
Each element Qi of Q can be interpreted as the expected maximum value their objective
function may take, given a fixed current state x and a fixed (arbitrary) immediate action u
taken by all agents.
Next, we define the Nash operator as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Nash Operator). Consider a collection of N concave real-valued functions,
fpuq “ pfipui,u´iqqiPN, where fi : UiŚU´i Ñ R. We define the Nash operator NuPUfpuq ÞÑ
fpu˚q, as a map from the collection of functions to their Nash equilibrium value u˚ P RN ,
where u˚ “ argNuPUfpuq is the unique point satisfying,
fi
`
ωi,u
˚´
i
˘ ď fi `ui,u˚´ i˘ , @ωi P Ui, and @i P N.(3.3)
For a sufficiently regular collection of functions f , the Nash operator corresponds to simulta-
neously maximizing each of the fi in their first argument ui.
This definition provides us with a relationship between the value function and agents’ Q-
function as V pxq “NuPUQpx;uq. Using the Nash operator, we may then express the Bellman
Equation (3.1) in a concise form as
V pxq “ N
uPUQpx;uq “ NuPU
"
rpx;uq ` γi E
x1„pp¨|x,uq
“
V px1q‰* ,(3.4)
which we refer to as the Nash-Bellman equation for the remainder of the paper. The definition
of the value function equation (3.4) implies that pi˚ “ NuPUQpx;uq. Hence, in order to
identify the Nash equilibrium pi˚, it is sufficient to obtain the Q-function and apply the Nash
operator to it. This principle will inform the approach we take in the remainder of the paper:
rather than directly searching the space of policy collections for the Nash-equilibrium via
equations (2.1) and (2.2), we may rely on identifying the function Q satisfying (3.4), and
thereafter compute pi˚ “NuPUQpx;uq.
4. Locally Linear-Quadratic Nash Q-Learning. In this section, we formulate an algo-
rithm which learns the Nash equilibrium of the stochastic game described in the previous
section. The principal idea behind the approach we take is to construct a parametric esti-
mator Qˆθ of agent-i’s Q-function, where we search for the set of parameters θ P Θ, which
results in estimators Qˆθ that approximately satisfy the Nash-Bellman equation (3.4). Thus,
our objective is to minimize the quantity
(4.1) E
x„ρ
x1„pp¨|x,uq
« ››››Qˆθpx;uq ´ rpx;uq ´ γi Nu1PUQˆθpx1;u1q
››››2
ff
,
over all u, where we define ρ to be an unconditional proability measure over game states
x. Equation (4.1) is designed as a measure of the gap between the right and left sides of
equation (3.4). We may also interpret it as the distance between Qˆθ and the true value of Q.
The expression (4.1) is intractable, since we do not know ρ nor pp¨|x,uq a-priori, and we wish
to make little to no assumptions on the system dynamics. Therefore, we rely on a simulation
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based method and approximate (4.1) with
(4.2) Lpθq “ 1
M
Mÿ
m“1
∥∥∥∥Qˆθpxm;umq ´ rpxm;umq ´ γi Nu1mPUQˆθpx1m;u1mq
∥∥∥∥2 ,
where for each m “ 1, 2, . . . ,M , pxm,um;x1mq represents an observed transition triplet from
the game. We then search for θ P Θ that minimizes the Lpθq in order to approximate Qˆ.
Our approach is motivated by Hu and Wellman [8] and Todorov & Li [19]. [8] presents
a Q-learning algorithm where Qˆ, which is assumed to take only finitely many values, can
be estimated through an update rule that relies on the repeated computation of the Nash
operator NuPUQˆθ. As the computation of NuPUQˆθ is NP-hard in general, this approach proves
to be computationally intractable beyond trivial examples. To circumvent this issue and to
make use of more expressive parametric models, we generalize and adapt techniques in Gu et
al. [5] to the multi-agent game setting to develop a computational and data efficient algorithm
for approximating the Nash equilibria.
In our algorithm, we make the additional assumption that game states x P X and actions
ui P Ui are real-valued. Specifically, we assume that X “ Rdx for some positive integer dx and
Ui “ Rdi for each i P N, where d1, . . . dN are all positive integers. For notational convenience
we define d´i :“ řjPN{tiu dj .1
We now define a specific model for the collection of approximate Q-functions Qˆθpx;uq “
pQˆθi px;uqqiPN. For each θ P Θ, we have Qˆθ : X
ŚU Ñ RN and decompose the Q-function
into two components:
(4.3) Qˆθpx;uq “ Vˆ θpxq ` pAθpx;uq ,
where Vˆ θpxq “ pVˆ θi pxqqiPN is a model of the collection of value functions so that Vˆ θ : X Ñ RN
and where pAθpx;uq “ p pAθi px;uqqiPN is what we refer to as the collection of advantage functions.
The advantage function represents the optimality gap between Qˆ and Vˆ . We further assume
that for each i P N, pAθi has the linear quadratic form
(4.4) pAθi px;uq “ ´ ˆ ui ´ µθi pxqu´i ´ µθ´ipxq
˙ᵀ
P θi pxq
ˆ
ui ´ µθi pxq
u´i ´ µθ´ipxq
˙
` `u´i ´ µθ´ipxq˘ᵀ Ψθi pxq ,
where the block matrix
(4.5) P θi pxq :“
ˆ
P θ11,ipxq P θ12,ipxq
P θ21,ipxq P θ22,ipxq
˙
,
µθi pxq : X Ñ Rdi with µθ´ipxq “ pµθi pxqqiPN, and Ψi : X Ñ Rd´i . In (4.5), P θ11,i : X Ñ Rdiˆdi ,
P θ12,i : X Ñ Rdiˆd´i , P θ21,i : X Ñ Rd´iˆdi and P θ22,i : X Ñ Rd´iˆd´i are matrix valued
functions, for each i P N. We require that P θ11,ipxq is positive-definite for all x P X and
without loss of generality we may choose P12,ipxq “ pP21,ipxqqᵀ, as the advantage function
depends only the symmetric combination of P12,i and P21,i.
1Our approach can be easily extended to the case of controls that are restricted to convex subsets of Rdi .
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Hence, rather than modelling Qˆθpx;uq, we instead model the functions Vˆ θ, µθ, and
tP θi ,Ψθi uiPN separately as functions of the state space X . Each of these functions can be
modeled by universal function approximators such as neural networks. The only major
restriction is that P θ11,ipxq must remain a positive-definite function of x. This restriction
is easily attained by decomposing P θ11,ipxq using Cholesky decomposition, so that we write
P θ11,ipxq “ Lθ11,ipxqpLθ11,ipxqqᵀ and instead model the lower triangular matrices Lθ11,i P Rdiˆdi .
The model assumption in (4.4) implicitly assumes that agent-i’s Q-function can be ap-
proximately written as a linear-quadratic function of the actions of each agent. One can
equivalently motivate such an approximation by considering a second order Taylor expansion
of Qi in the variable u around the Nash equilibrium, together with the assumption that the
Qi are convex functions of their input ui. This expansion, however, assumes nothing about
the dependence of Qi on the value of game state x.
The form of (4.4) is designed so that each Qˆθi px;ui,u´iq is a concave function of ui,
guaranteeing that NuPUQˆ is bijective. Moreover, under our model assumption, the Nash-
equilibrium is attained at the point u˚pxq “ µpxq and at this point, the advantage function is
zero, hence we obtain simple expressions for the value function and the equilibrium strategy
(4.6) Vˆ θpxq “ N
uPUQˆ
θpx;uq and µpxq “ arg N
uPUQˆ
θpx;uq .
Consequently, our model allows us to directly specify the Nash equilibrium strategy and
the value function of each agent through the functions µθ and Vˆ θ. The outcome of this
simplification is that the summand of the loss function in equation (4.2), which contains the
Nash equilibria and was itself previously intractable, becomes tractable. For each sample
observation m (consisting of a state xm, an um, and new state x
1
m) we then have a loss of
(4.7a) Lmpθq “
∥∥∥Vˆ θpxmq ` pAθpxm;umq ´ rpxm;umq ´ γi Vˆ θpx1mq∥∥∥2 ,
and all that remains is to minimize the total loss
(4.7b) Lpθq “ 1M
Mÿ
m“1
Lmpθq
over the parameters θ given a set of observed state-action triples pxm,um, x1mqMm“1.
4.1. Simplifying Game Structures. Equation (4.4) requires a parametric model of the
functions Vˆ θ, µθ,tP θi ,ΨiuiPN, which results in potentially a very large parameter space and
in principle result in requiring many training steps. In many cases, however, the structure of
the game can significantly reduce the dimension of the parameter space and leads to easily
learnable model structures. The following subsections enumerate these typical simiplications.
Label Invariance. Many games have symmetric players, and hence are invariant to a
permutation of the label of players. Such label invariance implies that each agent-i does not
differentiate among other game participants and the agent’s reward functional is independent
of any reordering of all other agents’ states and/or actions.
More formally, we assume that for an arbitrary agent-i, the game’s state can be represented
as x “ px0, xi, x´iq, where x0 represents the part of the game state not belonging to any
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agent, xi represents the portion of the game state belonging to agent-i and x´i “ txjujPN{tiu
represents the part of the game state belonging to other agents. Next, let Λ denote the set
of permutations over sets of N ´ 1 indices, where for each λ P Λ, we express the permutation
of a collection as λptyjuN´1j“1 q “ tykpjquN´1j“1 , where k : t1, . . . , N ´ 1u Ñ t1, . . . , N ´ 1u is a
one-to-one and onto map from the indices of the collection into itself.
Label invariance is equivalent to the assumption that for any λ P Λ, each agent’s reward
function satisfies
(4.8) ri px0, xi, λpx´iq ; ui, λpu´iqq “ ri px0, xi, x´i ; ui, u´iq .
With such label invariance, the form of the linear quadratic expansion of the advantage func-
tion in (4.4) simplifies. Assuming that dj “ d, for all j P N, independent label invariance in
only the actions of agents requires pAi to have the simplified form
(4.9)
pAθi px;uq “ ´ ›››ui ´ µθi pxq›››2
P θ11,ipxq
´
ÿ
jPN{tiu
A ´
ui ´ µipxqθ
¯
,
´
uj ´ µθjpxq
¯ E
P θ12,ipxq
´
ÿ
jPN{tiu
‖uj ´ µθjpxq‖2P θ22,ipxq `
ÿ
jPN{tiu
´
uj ´ µθjpxq
¯ᵀ
ψθpxq ,
for all i P N, where we use the notation }z}2M “ zᵀMz and xy, zyM “ yᵀMz for appropriately
sized matrices M . The functional form of (4.9) allows us to drastically reduce the size of the
matrices being modelled by an order of N2.
To impose label invariance on states, we require permutation invariance on the inputs the
function approximations Vˆ θ, µθ, tPi, ,ψθuiPN. [20] provide necessary and sufficient conditions
on neural network structures to be permutation invariant. This necessary and sufficient struc-
ture is defined as follows. Let φ : Rn1 Ñ Rn2 and σ : Rn2 Ñ Rn3 be two arbitrary functions.
From these functions, let finv : R
Jˆn1 Ñ Rn3 be the composition of these functions, such that
(4.10) finvpzq “ σ
˜
Jÿ
j“1
φpzjq
¸
.
It is clear that finv constructed in this manner is invariant to the reordering of the components
of z. Equation (4.10) may be interpreted as a layer which aggregates the all dimensions of
the inputs (which will corresponding to the state of all agents), through φ, and a layer that
transforms the aggregate result to the output, through σ. We assume further that φ and σ
are both neural networks with appropriate input and output dimension. This structure can
also be embedded as an input later inside of a more complex neural network.
Identical Preferences. It is quite common that the admissible actions of all agents are
identical, i.e., Ui “ U , @i P N, and agents have homogeneous objectives, or large sub-
populations of agents have homogeneous objectives. Thus far, we allowed agents to assign
different performance metrics, and the variations are show through the set of rewards and
discount rates, tri, γiuiPN. If agents have identical preferences, then we simply need to assume
ripx;uq “ rpx;uq and γi “ γ for all i P N. By the definition of total discounted reward,
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state-action value function, and value function, identical preferences and admissible actions
imply that Ri, Qi and Vi are independent of i.
In addition, the assumption of identical preferences, combined with the assumption of
label invariance can further reduce the parametrization of the advantage function. Under this
additional assumption we have that Vˆi, pAi must be identical for all i, which reduces modelling
of all of the Vˆ θi , µ
θ
i ,P
θ
i ,ψ
θ to modelling these for a single i. This further reduces the number
of functions that must be modeled by an order of N . The combined effect of label invariance
and identical preferences has a compounding effect which can have a large impact on the
modelling task, particularily when considering large populations of players.
Remark 4.1 (Sub-population Invariance and Preferences). We can also consider cases where
label and preference invariance occur within sub-population of agents, rather than across the
entire population. For example, in games in which some agents may cooperate with other
agents, we can assume that agents are indifferent to re-labeling of cooperators and non-
cooperators separately. Similarly, we can consider cases in which groups of agents share the
same performance metrics. Such situations, among others, lead to modelling simplifications
similar to equation (4.9) and simplifying neural network structures can be developed. In the
interest of space, we do not develop further examples simplifying examples, nor do we claim the
list we provide is exhaustive as one can easily imagine a multitude of other almost symmetric
cases that can be of interest.
5. Implementation of Nash Actor-Critic Algorithm. With the locally linear-quadratic
form of the advantage function, and the simplifying assumptions outlined in the previous
section, we can now minimize the objective (4.2), which reduces to the sum over (4.7), over the
parameters θ through an iterative optimization and sampling scheme. One could in principle
apply a simple stochastic gradient descent method using back-propagation on the appropriate
loss function. Instead, we propose an actor-critic style algorithm to increase stability and
efficiency of the algorithm. Actor-critic methods (see e.g. [13]) have been shown to provide
faster and more stable convergence of reinforcement learning methods towards their optima,
and our model lends itself naturally to such methods.
The decomposition in Equation (4.3) allows us to model the value function Vˆ indepen-
dently from other components. Therefore, we employ an actor-critic update rule to minimize
the loss function (4.7) by separating the parameter set θ “ pθV , θAq, where θV represents the
parameter set for modelling Vˆ θV and θA represents the parameter set used for modeling pAθA .
Our proposed actor-critic algorithm updates these parameters by minimizing the total loss
(5.1a) 1M
Mÿ
m“1
Lˆ pym, θV , θAq ,
where the individual sample loss corresponding to the error in the Nash-Bellman equation,
after already solving for the Nash-equilibria, is
(5.1b) Lˆpym, θV , θAq “
∥∥∥Vˆ θV pxmq ` pAθApxm;umq ´ rpxm;umq ´ γi Vˆ θV px1mq∥∥∥2 ,
with um, ym “ pxm,um, x1mq, and we minimize the loss by alternating between minimization
in the variables θA and θV .
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Algorithm 5.1 below provides an outline of the actor-critic procedure for our optimization
problem. We include a replay buffer and employ mini-batching. A replay buffer is a collection
of previously experienced transition tuples of the form yt “ pxt´1,u, xtq representing the
previous state of the system, the action taken in that state, the resulting state of the system,
and the reward during the transition. We randomly sample a mini-batch from the replay
buffer to update the model parameters using SGD. The algorithm also uses a na¨ıve Gaussian
exploration policy, although it may be replaced by any other action space exploration method.
During the optimization steps over θV and θA, we use stochastic gradient descent, or any other
Algorithm 5.1 Nash-DQN Actor-Critic Algorithm
Input : # Episodes B ą 0, Minibatch Size Mˆ ą 0, # of Game Steps N
Input : Exploration Noise tσbuBb“1 ą 0
Initialize: Replay Buffer D, Parameters pθA, θV q
for Episode bÐ 1 to B do
Reset Simulation, get initial state x0.
for Game steps tÐ 1 to N do
Select actions uÐ µθApxq `  ,  „ Np0, σbIq.
Observe state transition yt “ pxt´1,u, xtq from game.
Store D Ð yt “ pxt´1,u, xtq
Sample Y “ tyiuMˆi“1 randomly from D
Optimization Step of 1
Mˆ`1
ř
yPYŤtytu Lˆpy, θV , θAq over θV
Optimization Step of 1
Mˆ`1
ř
yPYŤtytu Lˆpy, θV , θAq over θA
end
end
return pθA, θV q
adaptive optimization methods.
6. Experiments. We test our algorithm on a multi-agent game that is important in the
study of behaviour on electronic exchanges called the optimal execution problem. The game
consists of agents trading a single asset with a stochastic price process that is affected by their
actions.
An arbitrary agent-i, i P N, may buy or sell νi,t P R of the asset at each time period
t P T :“ t0, 1, . . . , T u. At t “ T , agents must completely liquidate their holdings. Each
agent-i keeps track of their inventory qi,t “ qi,0 `řts“0 νi,s and inventories are visible to all
other agents. We assume the asset price process St evolves according to the discrete dynamics
(6.1) St`1 ´ St “ g1pSt,νtq∆T ` g2pSt,νtq
?
∆T ξt,
with initial condition S0. Here νt “ pνi,tqiPN and ξt are iid Np0, 1q for all t P T. The impact of
all agents’ actions appear through the drift and noise of the asset price dynamics through the
functions g1 and g2. We assume g1 and g2 are invariant with respect to the ordering of νt so
that, with the same inventory, S responds identically regardless of which agent is trading. In
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addition, each agent pays a transaction cost proportional to the amount they decide to buy or
sell during each time period. Agents keep track of their total cash from trading and we denote
the corresponding process Xi,t “ ´řts“0 νi,s pSs ` b1νi,sq, where b1 ą 0 is the transaction cost
constant.
The agent’s objective is to maximize the sum of (i) total cash they possess by time T , (ii)
a penalty for risk taking, and (iii) excess exposure at time T . We express agent-i’s objective
(total expected reward) as
(6.2) Ri :“ E
«
Xi,T ` qi,T pST ´ b2 qi,T q ´ b3
Tÿ
t“1
q2i,t∆T
ff
,
where b2, b3 ą 0. In Equation (6.2), the second term serves as a cost of instantaneously
liquidating the inventory at time T and the last term serves as a penalty for taking on excess
risk proportional to the square of the holdings at each time period. In this objective function,
the effect of all agent’s trading actions appears implicitly through the dynamics of St, and
through its effect on the cash process Xi,t. This particular form of objective assumes that
agents have identical preferences which are invariant to agent relabeling2. Hence, we may
employ the techniques discussed in Subsection 4.1 to simplify the form of the advantage
function pA. In our example, we model each component of the advantage function pA with
neural networks that includes a permutation invariant layer.
Our experiments assume a total of five agents over a time horizon of fifteen time steps
(T “ 15) with inventory levels restricted to be between positive and negative 100 units (qi,t P
r´100, 100s, for all i P N, t P T).
6.1. Features. We use the following features to represent the state xt of the environment
at time t:
Price (St): Scalar representing the current price of the asset,
Time (t): Scalar representing the current time step the agent is at in the time horizon, and
Inventory (pqi,tqiPN): Vector representing the inventory levels of all agents.
We assume the first two sets of features (price and time) plus each agent’s individual
inventory (qi,t) to be non-label invariant and all other agent’s inventory levels (tqi,tuiPN{tiu) to
be label invariant.
6.2. Network Details. The network structure for the advantage function approximationpAθA consists of two network components: (i) a permutation invariant layer that feeds into (ii)
a main network layer. The input of the permutation invariant layer are the label invariant
features. This layer, as described in Subsection 4.1, is a fully connected neural network
with three hidden layers each containing 20 nodes. Layers are connected by ReLU activation
functions. We then combine the output of this permutation invariant later with the non-label
invariant features and together they form the inputs to the main network. The main network
comprises of three hidden layers with 20, 40, and 20 nodes, respectively. The outputs of this
main network are the parameters µθ and tP θi ,ΨiuiPN, of the approximated advantage function
defined in Section 4. These parameters fully specify the value of the advantage function.
2We could extend this to include the case of sub-populations with homogeneous preferences, but that are
heterogeneous across sub-populations.
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The network structure for the value function approximation Vˆ θV contains four hidden
layers with 20, 60, 60, and 20 nodes respectively. This network takes the features from all
states described in Subsection 6.1 and outputs the approximate value function for all agents.
We use stochastic gradient descent with mini-batches to optimize the loss functions defined
in Section 5. Mini-batch sizes are set to one hundred uniformly sampled past experiences
from the replay buffer. The replay buffer is set to a maximum size of five thousand sets of
transitions where the oldest experienced transition is removed from the buffer when the size
limit is reached. Learning rates are set to 0.01 and are held constant throughout training.
Training is performed over a total of 15,000 simulations.
In the next two subsections, we investigate the results using two common price impact
functions – the linear case and the square-root case. In both cases, in the absence of trading,
the price process is assumed to mean-revert.
6.3. Linear Price Impact. In this example, we assume a mean-reverting price process
with a linear price impact, which corresponds to choosing
(6.3) g1pSt,νtq “ κ pθ ´ Stq ` b1
ÿ
iPN
νi,t, and g2pSt,νtq “ σ,
where b1, κ, θ, σ ą 0 are constants corresponding to the price impact of net trades, the rate
of mean-reversion of the price process, the level of mean-reversion, and the asset’s volatility,
respectively. We denote the average inventory of all other agents and the corresponding
average inventory as
(6.4) ν¯´i :“ 1N´1
ÿ
jPN{tiu
νj,t, and q¯´i :“ 1N´1
ÿ
jPN{tiu
qj,t, @i P N,
respectively.
For our experiments, we use the parameters in Table 1. Recall that the agents’ reward
function are given by (6.2) and that b2 and b3 correspond to terminal and running risk penal-
ties. In order to impose the restriction that the agent must be in a neutral position at time
step T, we set b2 “ `8.
Table 1: Asset price process, price Impact, and risk preference parameters.
κ θ σ b1 b2 b3 ∆T
0.1 10 1 0.3 `8 0.1 1
Figure 1 illustrates the resulting Nash-equilibria by looking at the optimal trading strategy
for a single agent. Specifically, it shows the heatmap of the first agent’s optimal actions ν1,t as
time, price, inventory, and the average inventory of other agents vary. Panels (a), (b), and (c)
represents states in which the average inventory levels of all other agents are long (q¯´i “ 20),
zero(q¯´i “ 0), and short (q¯´i “ ´20), respectively. Each panel is further divided into subplots
of varying asset prices t$6, $8, . . . , $14u from left to right. Each individual subplot’s y-axis
represents the first agent’s inventory level and x-axis represents the current time step.
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(a) q¯´i “ 20 (b) q¯´i “ 0 (c) q¯´i “ ´20
Figure 1: Optimal trade execution heatmaps for linear price impact as a function of time,
inventory, price, and average inventory of other agents. Within each panel, subplots corre-
sponds to price levels $6, $8, . . . , $14 from left to right. The dotted line shows the threshold
where the agent switches from buying to selling.
Figure 2: Sample inventory paths and corresponding price paths for the linear impact model.
Solid lines represent agents’ inventory paths, dotted line represent asset price path.
As the plots demonstrate, whenever the agent’s inventory is significantly negative, they
tend to buy, and when it is significantly positive they tend to sell. The threshold at which the
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switch occurs depends on other features of the system including: the time since the beginning
of the trading horizon, the price of the asset, and the inventory levels of the other agents.
The closer the system is to the end of the trading horizon, the closer this threshold is to zero
inventory levels. This is a byproduct of restricting all agents to have neutral positions at time
step T . Within any one panel, and moving from the left to right subplots, the threshold moves
downwards and sometimes falls below zero inventory. In contrast, higher average inventories
of other agents generally increases the threshold.
Some of these features can be seen more clearly through sample inventory paths of agents
acting according to the optimal strategy – see Figure 2. Initial inventories of all agents are
randomly drawn from a normal distribution (q0 „ Np0, σqIq, σq “ 5) but remain constant
across columns but vary across rows. Initial asset price are randomly drawn from a normal
distribution (p0 „ Np10, σpq, σp “ 1) but remain constant across rows but vary across columns.
The asset price process is simulated (using the impact functions (6.3) and dynamics in (6.1))
with the same random seed across rows but vary across columns. Generally, the inventories of
all agents converge, eventually vanish at the end of the trading horizon, and react to changes
in the asset price but buying when prices are low and selling when prices are high.
6.4. Square-Root Price Impact. Another important price impact function is the square
root impact which corresponds to choosing:
(6.5) g1pSt,νtq “ κ pθ ´ Stq ` b1sgnpν¯tq
a|ν¯t|, and g2pSt,νtq “ σ,
where b1, κ, θ, σ ą 0 are constants corresponding to the price impact of net trades, the rate
of mean-reversion of the price process, the level of mean-reversion, and the assets’s volatility,
respectively.
For our experiments, we use the same parameters as in Table 1. As a reminder, the
agents’ reward function are given by (6.2) and b2 and b3 correspond to terminal and running
risk penalties. The analogues of the heatmaps and sample inventory paths in Figures 1 and 2
for the square-root case may be found in Figures 3 and 4.
Much of the same observations from Subsection 6.3 hold in the square-root case, however,
one key difference is the magnitude of the effect that other agents’ inventories have on the single
agent’s optimal actions. Here, the impact of increasing other agents’ inventories is significantly
lower than the case with linear price. This can also be observed, albeit less clearly, from the
sample inventory paths in Figure 4 where agents with initial inventories significantly different
from zero converges more slowly to other agents’ inventories – see particularly the center
panels.
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(a) q¯´i “ 20 (b) q¯´i “ 0 (c) q¯´i “ ´20
Figure 3: Optimal trade execution heatmaps for square-root price impact as a function of time,
inventory, price, and average inventory of other agents. Within each panel, subplots corre-
sponds to price levels $6, $8, . . . , $14 from left to right. The dotted line shows the threshold
where the agent switches from buying to selling.
Figure 4: Sample inventory paths and corresponding price paths for the square-root impact
model. Solid lines represent agents’ inventory paths, dotted line represent asset price path.
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7. Conclusions. Here we present a computationally tractable reinforcement framework
for multi-agent (stochastic) games. Our approach utilizes function approximations after de-
composing the collection of agents’ state-action value functions into the individual value func-
tions and their advantage functions. Further, we approximate the advantage function in a
locally linear-quadratic form and use neural-net architectures to approximate both the value
and advantage function. Typical symmetries in games allow us to use permutation invari-
ant neural-nets, motivated by the Arnold-Kolmogorov representation theorem, to reduce the
dimensionality of the parameter space. Finally, we develop an actor-critic paradigm to esti-
mate parameters and apply our approach to two important applications in electronic trading.
Our approach is data efficient, and is applicable to large number of players and continuous
state-action spaces.
There are a number of doors left open for exploration including extending our approach
to the case when there are latent factors driving the environment, and when the state of all
agents are partially (or completely) hidden from any individual agent. As well, our approach
can be easily applied to mean-field games which correspond to the infinite population limit of
stochastic games that have interactions where any individual agent has only an infinitesimal
contribution to the state dynamics.
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